

## Online Appendix

### Military Loyalty and the Failure of Democratization in Africa: How Ethnic Armies Shape the Capacity of Presidents to Defy Term Limits

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**Table A1: Correlation Matrix for the Determinants of Term Limit Challenges**

	Ethnic Army	Oil Producer	Precedent	Challenge
Ethnic Army	1	0.29	-0.26	0.47
Oil Producer		1	-0.14	0.39
Precedent			1	-0.44
Challenge				1

**Table A2: How Mass Mobilization Shapes the Outcome of Term Limit Challenges**

Mass Mobilization?	Outcome of Term Limit Challenge		
		success	failure
		yes	failure
	yes	Burundi (Nkurunziza 2015) Cameroon (Biya 2011) Congo-B (Sassou-Nguesso 2016) Djibouti (Guélélé 2011)	Benin (Boni Yayi 2016) Burkina Faso (Campaoré 2015) Senegal (Wade 2012) Zambia (Chiluba 2001)
	no	Chad (Deby 2006) Gabon (Bongo 2005) Guinea (Conté 2003) Namibia (Nujoma 1999) Sudan (Bashir 2005) Togo (Eyadéma 2003) Uganda (Museveni 2006)	Malawi (Muluzi 2004) Niger (Tandja 2009) Nigeria (Obasanjo 2007)

Note: bivariate correlation = -0.17;  $X^2 = 0.15$  ( $p > 0.7$ ); bivariate logit (challenge ~ ethnic army) = -0.69 ( $p > 0.49$ ).

## Ethnic Army Data

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
<b>Benin</b>	<b>2006</b>	Kerekou	0	Progress made towards ending northern dominance under prior leader Soglo, who was recognized for reform and ending imbalance by other military leaders at regional conference on Democratization in Africa. No evidence that Kerekou changed direction.	Foltz and McDonald 1995; and Minority Rights Group 2010.
<b>Benin</b>	<b>2016</b>	Boni Yayi	0	Ethnic balance within the military a priority under Kerekou; he introduced a representative quota based system of officer recruitment that has been continued by subsequent governments.	Akindes 2015, 52 & 56-58.
<b>Botswana</b>	<b>2008</b>	Moage	0	No attempts have ever been made to manipulate the BDF and its leadership hierarchy on the basis of kin, tribe, or ethnicity.	N'Diaye 2006.
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	<b>2015</b>	Campaore	0	Reports of rampant personal loyalty and patronage within the military but no mention of ethnicity.	Dwyer (Forthcoming).
<b>Burundi</b>	<b>2015</b>	Nkurunziza	0	Prior to the 2005 elections, under the peace accords, the military officer corps was integrated and brought into a 50-50 balance between Hutus and Tutsis.	Samii 2013.
<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>2011</b>	Biya	1	Biya stacked the military with coethnic Beti and Bulu.	Harkness 2016.

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
<b>Cape Verde</b>	<b>2001</b>	Monteiro	0	Population highly intermixed and largely, homogenously creole/mestiço. Precludes creation of an ethnic army.	Meyns 2002, 159.
<b>Cape Verde</b>	<b>2011</b>	Pires	0	Population highly intermixed and largely, homogenously creole/mestiço. Precludes creation of an ethnic army.	Meyns 2002, 159.
<b>Chad</b>	<b>2006</b>	Deby	1	Zhagawa dominated military from 1994, after Deby took power.	Massey and May 2006, 444.
<b>Congo-Brazaville</b>	<b>2016</b>	Sassou-Nguesso	1	M'Boshi dominated the armed forces under Nguesso.	Minority Rights Group 2010.
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>2011</b>	Guelleh	1	Guelleh's predecessor, Aptidon, forced many Afar out of the army in the 70s and his government was generally dominated by Issa; none of the peace agreements with the Afar rebels included military integration; Guelleh's subclan, the Mamassan, dominate the civil service, business sector, and security institutions.	Bollee 2003; Metelits and Matti 2013, footnote 4; and Minority Rights Group 2010.
<b>Gabon</b>	<b>2005</b>	Bongo	1	Batéké over-represented in government ministries and particularly in the security sector under Bongo; Bongo's inner circle was always a clique of ethnic kinsmen and family members.	Decalo 1998, 138; and Minority Rights Group 2010.

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
Ghana	2000	Rawlings	0	In 1984-87, Rawlings increased reliance on Ewe officers and troops. Yet, after, some diversity maintained, merit-based promotion policies created, and political interference ended.	Hansen 1991, 40; Hutchful 1997, 256-258; and Hutchful 2003, 86-87.
Ghana	2008	Kufuor	0	Rawlings diversified the military in his later years of rule; Kufour administration disbanded and integrated into normal military all parallel military structures and introduced a policy of regional balance in recruitment; major ethnic groups represented in top of the hierarchy.	Hutchful 2003, 86-87; and Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 91-92.
Guinea	2003	Conte	1	Disproportionate number of senior military officers are from Conte's Soussou ethnic group.	Freedom House 2004.
Kenya	2002	Moi	1	Moi put officers of his own group in key command positions and replaced Kikuyu officers with Kalenjin; by mid-90s army thoroughly Kalenjin.	N'Diaye 2001, 130-131.
Kenya	2012	Kibaki	1	Kinaki purged the higher ranks and replaced Kalenjin officers with Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru.	Hornsby 2013, 712-713.
Malawi	2004	Muluzi	1	Muluzi continued Banda's policy of promoting southern officers.	Decalo 1998, 101.

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
<b>Mali</b>	<b>2002</b>	Konare	0	No mention of ethnically-based military recruitment practices in any of the sources for post-independence Mali. In 1996, former Taureg rebels were even integrated into the officer corps.	Bennett 1975; Clark 2000; Imperato 1996; Keegan 1983. 386-387; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009; and Kroc Institute, “Military Reform: National Pact.”
<b>Mali</b>	<b>2012</b>	Touré	0	No mention of ethnically-based military recruitment practices in any of the sources for post-independence Mali. In 1996, former Taureg rebels were even integrated into the officer corps.	Bennett 1975; Clark 2000; Imperato 1996; Keegan 1983, 386-387; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009; and Kroc Institute, “Military Reform: National Pact.”
<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>2004</b>	Chissano	0	1992 peace agreement provided for military integration, drawing equally from Frelimo and Renamo, including officers and the high command; since Frelimo had drawn its support from the South and the Shangaan, and Renamo from the north and the Shona, this suggests ethnic diversity in the military. Sources do not report a change to the situation, which would be a violation of the peace treaty.	Kroc Institute, “Military Reform: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique”; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Vines 2013, 379-380.

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>2014</b>	Guebuza	0	1992 peace agreement provided for military integration, drawing equally from Frelimo and Renamo, including officers and the high command; since Frelimo had drawn its support from the South and the Shangaan, and Renamo from the north and the Shona, this suggests ethnic diversity in the military. Sources do not report a change to the situation, which would be a violation of the peace treaty.	Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique"; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Vines 2013, 379-380.
<b>Namibia</b>	<b>1999</b>	Nujoma	0	National army created by integrating SWAPO, largely Ovambo, with ethnic battalions of SWATF, including many non-Ovambo.	Leys and Saul 1995, 58.
<b>Namibia</b>	<b>2004</b>	Nujoma	0	National army created by integrating SWAPO, largely Ovambo, with ethnic battalions of SWATF, including many non-Ovambo groups.	Leys and Saul 1995, 58; and Preston 1997.
<b>Namibia</b>	<b>2014</b>	Pohamba	0	No changes noted in sources from diverse military under Nujoma.	Lamb 2006; and Seabra 2016.
<b>Niger</b>	<b>2009</b>	Tandja	0	Zarma/Djerma and Songhai comprised 70% or more of the officer corps prior to the first democratic elections in 1993; 1997-2003 former Taureg rebels integrated into the military, including into the officer corps and the elite Republican Guard.	Ibrahim 1994, 25; and Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: Agreement between..."

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>2007</b>	Obasanjo	0	Appointed officers from minority groups, particularly from the middle belt; large-scale retirements of officers and restructuring but not noted to be ethnic in character.	Adejumobi 2001, 18; and Ojo 2006, 263.
<b>Sao Tome</b>	<b>2001</b>	Trovoada	0	No evidence found of ethnic preference in the military. Largely Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions.	Chabal and Birmingham 2002; Keegan 1983, 501; Pham 2016; and Porto 2003.
<b>Sao Tome</b>	<b>2011</b>	Menezes	0	No evidence found of ethnic preference in the military. Largely Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions.	Chabal and Birmingham 2002; Keegan 1983, 501; Pham 2016; and Porto 2003.
<b>Senegal</b>	<b>2012</b>	Wade	0	No evidence found of ethnic stacking under any leader.	Keegan 1983; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Minorities at Risk 2009.
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	<b>2007</b>	Kabbah	0	Post-conflict restructuring under British included provisions for fair representation of all ethnic groups in recruiting and merit-based hiring.	Gbla 2006, 83.
<b>Sudan</b>	<b>2005</b>	Bashir	na	Post-2005 information on the officer corps not available.	Johnson and Thurber 2016.

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
Tanzania	1995	Mwinyi	0	Nyerere believed in harmony of all tribes and recruited officers and rank-and-file diversly (both across tribes and across socio-economic classes). No preference given to any group. Merit based system established. No reported change from previous policies.	Lupogo 2001; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Minorities at Risk 2009.
Tanzania	2005	Mkapa	0	Nyerere believed in harmony of all tribes and recruited officers and rank-and-file diversly (both across tribes and across socio-economic classes). No preference given to any group. Merit based system established. No reported change from previous policies.	Lupogo 2001; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Minorities at Risk 2009.
Tanzania	2015	Kikwete	0	Nyerere believed in harmony of all tribes and recruited officers and rank-and-file diversly (both across tribes and across socio-economic classes). No preference given to any group. Merit based system established. No reported change from previous policies.	Lupogo 2001; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Minorities at Risk 2009.
Togo	2003	Eyadema	1	In 2005, Eyadema died and his son was installed in his place. Under Gnassingbé, the Kébyé have remained dominant in the military.	Minority Rights Group 2010.
Uganda	2006	Museveni	1	Top positions in the military dominated by the Banyankole. 10/15 lifetime members of the Defense Forces Council and 5/6 High Command Banyankole.	Carbone 2008, 46-47; and Kagoro 2016, 168.

Country	Year	Leader	Ethnic Army	Brief Narrative	Sources
Zambia	2001	Chiluba	0	No particular ethnic predominated as of the mid 80s under Kaunda; Bemba may even have been under-represented; No evidence of a change in policy under Chiluba to promote Bemba within the military.	Keegan 1983, 679-680; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Minorities at Risk 2009

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